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Abstract
A considerable theoretical and empirical literature studies the corporation’s capital structure. Economists
have paid less attention to capital structure in other enterprise forms such as partnerships, which typically operate under different legal constraints and appeal to smaller enterprises. Yet partnerships were
the dominant business organization for the period in which wealthy countries first experienced long-run
economic growth, and they remain quantitatively significant in some important economies today. We
use a series of simple models to study several aspects of the partnership’s choice of capital structure.
We show that common features of partnerships reflect the difficulty of raising capital for ventures whose
prospects are hard to judge. We also consider the implications of a rule in partnership law that prevents
limited partners from playing a role in management, and the implications of the partnership form for
projects subject to hold-up.1
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Introduction

A rich empirical and theoretical literature in economics and finance studies the corporation’s capital structure: what kinds of equity and debt claims it issues, why the mix of those claims differs for different firms and
in different environments, and how that capital structure both influences and reflects the enterprise’s governance. Aspects of that literature are quite general, but most contributions make a number of assumptions
that limit the scope of analysis to corporations, even to public corporations.
Many firms today are not corporations, however, and corporations played little role in the historical
development of the economies that are wealthy today. Britain’s Industrial Revolution, for example, took
place in an era when forming a corporation was for legal reasons extremely difficult. There were almost
no industrial corporations in Britain during this period. The Continental economies began to industrialize
later. During the early stages of their industrialization, these countries also authorized few corporations
outside quasi-utility sectors such as railroads. Only in the United States do we see significant numbers of
corporations, especially in industrial sectors, before the mid-nineteenth century. Even when governments
expanded access to the corporation, many firms organized using a different legal form. The corporation was
neither necessary for industrialization nor the preferred enterprise form for all firms.
The corporation represents just one of the enterprise forms a firm could choose. Table 1 presents some of
the dimensions along which a business enterprise can be formed, along with sub-sets of the legal variations
for each. Even this abbreviated list suggests over a hundred possible ways to organize a firm, only one of
which looks like the modern corporation. The entrepreneur’s choice from the set of enterprise forms sheds
light on the information problems firms struggle with.
This paper extends the analysis of capital-structure and related decisions to multi-owner firms that
are not corporations. We call these firms, somewhat loosely, “partnerships.” Firms typically organize as
partnerships today in limited, specific contexts, often when human capital is the most important asset. As
we show below, however, historically partnerships dominated the ranks of firms in most sectors, including
manufacturing and commercial enterprises.
Using models that are not themselves novel, we consider the problem of a capital-constrained entrepreneur
in an environment of asymmetric information. The models we develop represent current ideas about information and incentives in the economics literature. Each model has some parallel to theoretical approaches
in corporate finance. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we consider firms for which the information and
incentive problems differ from the typical corporation’s because of the firm’s size and the context in which
it operates. Second, the corporate-finance literature contemplates a given enterprise making choices about
what types of equity and debt claims to issue. For the firms we study, decisions about equity and debt
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represent not just financing decisions, but choices over the legal form of enterprise. If a partnership wanted
to issue limited-liability equity claims, for example, it had to change to a different partnership form operating
under different rules.
Our approach differs from the standard treatment of the firm in the corporate-finance literature in two
important ways.2 First, we assume the entrepreneur may be risk-averse and can invest a significant proportion
of his wealth in the enterprise. This assumption has no real counterpart in most corporate finance research;
there, the firm may have block shareholders, but those block shareholders are viewed as either risk-neutral or
well-diversified. Second, we consider an information environment where a group of individuals may be betterinformed than “the market” concerning the firm’s prospects. That is, we consider social ties within a business
community or even social group as part of the environment relevant to the capital-structure decision. The
corporate-finance literature does not contemplate this kind of social environment. Our analysis also respects
the constraints put on capital-structure choices by the legal rules governing companies. Most importantly,
we do not assume the separation of ownership and control that motivates many questions in the corporategovernance literature.3
We first outline the main legal differences across the several enterprise forms and present evidence on
the historical and present-day ubiquity of non-corporate forms. We then model several issues concerning
a partnership’s capital structure. Throughout, we contemplate an entrepreneur starting a firm. Therefore, creditors cannot use past successes and failures to judge the enterprise’s success probability. This
entrepreneur has the power to make all capital structure decisions, subject only to the constraints implied
by the law and other agents’ incentives. We focus on enterprises that have capital needs beyond the scope
of their founder’s wealth.4 We consider five questions:
First, many entrepreneurs invest a significant fraction of their own wealth in their firm, even in environments where diversification is easy. Why? We show that by investing heavily in their own firm, entrepreneurs
can signal their “type” to other investors (both equity and credit).
Second, outside equity investors in small firms often come from a restricted social circle. Many are
family members. This fact implies that peer groups forgo opportunities to diversify, and is puzzling because
one would assume the cost of capital would fall with the size of the group of potential investors. This
consideration is a key reason for the public corporation. We show this fact may reflect the difficulty of
signaling quality to uninformed investors when the entrepreneurs have too little wealth to serve this purpose
(as in the first model). By taking on partners who are known to have better signals, the entrepreneur both
2 We

discuss some exceptions below.
focus on corporations in the finance literature has a counterpart in the economic history literature, which tends to
accept Chandler’s (1977) stress on the corporation as central to economic development, especially in the late nineteenth century.
4 There may be an additional set of incentive problems on the real side between a firm and its upstream and downstream
business partners. These issues are not the focus of this paper.
3 The
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acquires more equity and reassures the uninformed capital market about his project.
Third, partners often do not at first pay in the capital they have committed to the firm. This “unpaid” (or “uncalled”) capital can be a feature of limited partnership investments, and is implicit in any
unlimited-liability ownership stake.5 We consider this feature in two ways. Unpaid capital can obviate ex
post verification problems for other equity owners; the entrepreneur has less incentive to “run away.” Similarly, unpaid capital addresses both adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems in credit markets, allowing
one or more owners to implicitly pledge collateral without liquidating other investments.
Fourth, in many jurisdictions, a partner can be “ordinary” and bear full unlimited liability for the firm’s
obligations, or invest as a “limited” partner, who cannot lose more than he invested in the firm. Ordinary
partners help run the enterprise, while limited partners usually cannot participate in management. We ask
when the entrepreneur takes on an ordinary partner versus when the firm expands by taking a limited partner,
focusing on a tradeoff: a sufficiently high-quality ordinary partner helps improve firm decisions. But if there
are important information asymmetries across partners, an ordinary partner can introduce moral-hazard
problems, and the firm does better with the passive capital contributed by a limited partner.
Finally, we shift to a different aspect of capital structure: whether it is locked into the enterprise in
question. Partnerships are effectively at-will, meaning that an owner can threaten to withdraw his capital
as a way of forcing renegotiation of profit allocations. This hold-up problem does not exist in corporations
and similar legal forms where capital, once paid in, cannot be withdrawn. We show that the avoidance of
hold-up can be a significant reason to shift away from a partnership form.
There are many other differences between corporations and other business forms. In this paper, we
abstract away from two especially important issues. First, tax rules today sometimes make partnership
forms attractive because they reduce or obviate the problem of double taxation of enterprise income and
the investor’s personal income. Second, partnerships can have trouble binding the firm qua firm. If the firm
itself cannot contract with others, the partners have to sign all contracts individually, or use other law to
give one individual power to sign on their behalf. The severity of these problems depends heavily on the
specific legal environment. Both issues doubtlessly affect the choice of enterprise form, but to maintain focus
on capital structure we set them aside.6
5 Corporations

in some times and places also have unpaid capital; see the discussion in Section 4.3.
Guinnane et al. (2007) for more on the issues mentioned here. Most jurisdictions did not impose significant taxes
on business firms until World War I or later, and those that did attempted to avoid taxing the same revenue streams twice.
The problems of binding a partnership as an entity depends on specific legal rules. The U.K. and the United States treated
partnerships as contracts among individuals, and in those countries the problem was acute. The French Code de Commerce
(1808, §22) made all owners of the Société en nom collectif responsible for the firm’s obligations, even if contracted by a single
owner. Continental business-registry systems such as those established in Germany give partnerships something closer to the
status of the entity; a partnership registered under the business law can ordinarily make legally binding contracts as a firm.
See Guinnane (2017). Hansmann et al. (2006) stress a different issue. Limited liability protects an investor’s assets from the
firm’s creditors. What they call “entity shielding” protects the firm’s assets from claims against the assets of the firm’s owners.
We assume all the firms we consider enjoyed entity shielding in that sense.
6 See
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Our models draw on standard arguments in the economics of incentives and information. Only the focus
is new; the question we pose has attracted little attention from economists. The few treatments of enterprise
form in the economics literature focus on narrower questions. The most recent discussions of partnerships
focus on human rather than physical capital. Both Levin and Tadelis (2005) and, more recently, Kaya
and Vereshchagina (2014) find that partnerships represent the best organization for skill-intensive team
production. In their models, partnerships have a role in professional services and similar activities only.7 In
contrast, we demonstrate important reasons for the ubiquity of partnerships outside these sectors. Cai (2003)
studies a general problem of two parties making investments to achieve a common end. The investments can
be general or specific, and they might be complements or substitutes. Cai considers a full range of outcomes,
showing conditions under which joint asset ownership is optimal. His joint asset structure captures some
aspects of the partnership. Spulber (2009)’s more general model focuses on consumer-entrepreneurs in a
general equilibrium setting. Spulber derives the choice of sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation
endogenously, and thus deals with questions closer to those of this paper. Given his goals, he is forced to
abstract from important specific features of partnerships and closely-related forms that we study in depth.
Most of our discussion is theoretical and thus not tied to any particular time or place. We focus on the
menu of choices available for the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, to take advantage
of two features of the period. First, we can abstract from a number of legal and regulatory features of later
periods, allowing us to achieve a tighter focus (one example would be the tax issue mentioned above). Second,
this period offers unusual access to counts of firms taking the different forms. Our empirical discussion draws
heavily on five countries: France, Germany, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom. Four of these
countries (Spain is the exception) counted among the leading industrial societies of their age, so the rules
we are dealing with were not those of a stagnant, backward economy. Because of related projects, we have
developed extensive databases for firms in these countries in this period, allowing a better match between
theory and evidence. The decisions we model have close analogues both earlier and later. The legal structure
we assume was first codified in the French Code de Commerce of 1808, but the Code largely formalized earlier
rulings, so much of what we say is relevant for earlier periods. By the twentieth century, the proliferation
of enterprise forms and efforts to tax businesses as entities adds new considerations to the decisions we
contemplate. But even today, entrepreneurs forming a new business face some version of the decisions we
model.
7 Similarly, Morrison and Wilhelm (2008) focus on the formation of human capital in investment-banking partnerships, while
Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) discuss general theoretical problems in the passing on of human capital. None of them apply to
the present case, which focuses on the financial capital issues encountered by the first-generation entrepreneur.
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Enterprise forms

The public corporation contemplated in most of the corporate-finance literature can issue a wide variety
of equity and credit claims without fundamentally altering the firm. Partnership forms are different: legal
rules constrain the types of claims an extant enterprise form can issue. For some purposes, issuing a new
type of claim requires winding up the firm and re-forming it as something else. Corporations can and do
agree to specific covenants when issuing particular claims. But this is contractual, and not inherent in the
corporation’s structure. Partnership rules tie specific types of equity claims to governance rules in ways
inherent to the form.

2.1

The legal rules

The legal rules governing enterprise forms differ across time and space, but they exhibit commonalities that
justify the stylized characterizations used here. Most of the European Continent drew heavily on the Code
de Commerce, and the approach embodied in that law survives in Europe today. Enterprise law differed in
important respects in the United Kingdom and the United States, and in England’s other former colonies.8
Table 2 summarizes the main rules pertaining to the enterprise forms available in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. An entrepreneur establishing a multi-owner firm had two basic options, the partnership or
the corporation. There were two types of partnership. In an ordinary partnership, all owners bore unlimited
liability for the firm’s debts, and all owners could participate in running the enterprise. A limited partnership
had general partners who ran the firm and bore unlimited liability for the firm’s debts, as well as limited
partners who could not participate in management but whose losses were limited to the amount of their
investment.9
Partnership law allowed owners to contract flexibly on investment, cash-flow and control rights. In the
United Kingdom and the United States, partnerships were private contracts. Some Continental countries
established a business registry that gave enrolled partnerships extra privileges. There were effectively no
restrictions on the formation of partnerships.
Each corporation at first required specific permission from the State. Firms given the right to incorporate
could be required to share some of the benefits of incorporation with the State via free equity stakes,
investment in favored projects, etc. The Bank of England (1694), for example, received a corporate charter
and a monopoly on corporate banknote issue in return for assistance with financing government debt. This
8 La Porta et al. (1998) stress the commonality of law within legal families they define as “common law” and “civil law.”
Nothing in this paper relies on this distinction.
9 The rule against a limited partner’s participation in management differed slightly across jurisdictions. The 2001 amendments
to the U.S. Uniform Partnership Act dealt away with the requirement that any partner have unlimited liability. Thus in states
that adopt the UPA, limited partnerships today do not have an unlimited partner.
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“concession system” gave way to a system of “general incorporation” that allowed any group of entrepreneurs
to create a new corporation as long as the firm adhered to specific norms. The norms could be severe: partly
to protect the public, most countries imposed publicity, minimum capitalization, and other requirements.
General incorporation came to Britain in 1844, but did not reach France until 1867, most of Germany
until 1870, and other European countries even later. Most scholars date the British Industrial Revolution
to the period 1760-1820. Harris (2000, Table 8.4) estimates that a total of 720 corporations were known to
London equity markets in 1843. Of these, most were banks or insurance companies, or a utility such as a gas
company, railroad, or canal. Only a handful of the manufacturing firms that were central to industrialization
organized as corporations. Thus the corporation played little direct role in Britain’s industrial transition. The
U.S. had a distinctly different experience from which one cannot generalize. Several U.S. states introduced
general incorporation for manufacturing firms before Britain’s 1844 Act, and nearly all U.S. states allowed
more liberal access to the corporate form than was found outside of Britain.10
Starting at the end of the nineteenth century several countries introduced another legal form that has
some characteristics of the partnership and some characteristics of the corporation. These enterprise forms,
including the German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH, 1892) and the British Private Limited
Company (PLC, 1907), allow all owners to have limited liability and to participate in management. The new
forms also lock in capital. (They differ from partnerships and corporations, and from each other, in other ways
that we have deferred to later analysis.) Guinnane et al. (2007) call these enterprises, collectively, “Private
Limited-liability Companies” or PLLCs. The modern U.S. limited-liability company (LLC) is similar, for
our purposes, to these PLLCs.11
We stress two other, related aspects of equity investment. One is ownership with unlimited liability. Most
10 There

were alternatives to a corporate concession that lie beyond the scope of our analysis. In some countries, limited
partnerships created limited partner shares that traded much like corporate equity. Because these firms were partnerships, they
did not require a concession (and at least one owner still had unlimited liability). The practice was rare outside France. In
England the Bubble Act (1720) forbade the creation of corporations without a royal concession. In the years following, some
English firms adopted an unincorporated joint-stock form that partially substituted for corporations. For the English law and
its development, see Harris (1997, 2000). Freeman (2011) study unincorporated joint-stock companies between the Bubble
Act and the advent of general incorporation. Hilt (2017) notes that many U.S. states that did not have general incorporation
made the concession system so routine as to approximate general incorporation. New York introduced the first U.S. general
incorporation statue in 1811. Pennsylvania enacted a similar law in 1836. A few early enactors such as Ohio and New Jersey
repealed their statutes but put them back in force later. The Prussian Act of 1843 standardized the corporate form and made
it easier for entrepreneurs to anticipate which ventures would receive royal favor, but did not lead to a dramatic increase in
numbers of corporations formed. See Guinnane (2017b).
11 The French SARL (Société à responsabilité limitée), introduced in 1925, owes much to the GmbH. The British Private
Limited Company (1907) reflects a modification of the 1862 Companies Act for smaller firms that did not want to list shares
on markets. The Spanish SRL (Sociedad de responsabilidad limitada) dates to 1919 and owes something to both the PLC
and the GmbH. See Guinnane (2018) for the political economy of the GmbH’s creation, and Martínez Rodríguez (2016) for
an account of the SRL. The ability to create hybrids by combining forms creates flexibility we assume away here. The most
common hybrid inserts a legal person (usually a PLLC) as the general partner in a limited partnership. Typically the limited
partners and the PLLC’s owners are the same individuals. This arrangement allows the firm to assign profits to the limited
partnership shares (and thus escape enterprise taxes), and overcome any restriction on the limited partners running the firm.
The extremely popular German GmbH & Co KG, a limited partnership in which a GmbH serves as general partner, is an
example of this arrangement. A growing literature studies the determinants of the choice of legal form. Contributions include
Musacchio and Gómez-Galvarriato (2004) and Musacchio et al (2008) on Mexico; Abramitsky et al (2010) on Brazil; and Hilt
and O’Banion (2009) on New York State.
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corporate equity shares today carry limited liability, and this was an almost-universal feature of corporate
shares from the first days of general incorporation.12 A general partner under the relevant partnership rules
contributes a fixed, contractually-specified sum to the firm’s operating capital, but if the firm fails, the owner
can be held liable for additional sums up to the value of all he owns.13 A second common investment form
was an equity stake with limited liability but also some unpaid capital. An owner might agree to a limited
£100 investment but only pay in £30 in capital. The partner would receive dividends reckoned on what
he paid in (£30), and the remaining £70 would matter in two different ways. First, the firm could “call”
some or all of the additional capital – that is, demand that the partner(s) pay in more of the outstanding
sum. Second, the £70 allowed the firm to offer creditors more in security than it actually worked with on a
day-to-day basis.

2.2

Prevalence and survival of non-corporate forms

These alternatives to corporations were quantitatively important. Table 2 reports the distribution of new
enterprises by legal form for France, Germany, and Spain for selected years in the period 1887-1932.14
Overall, partnerships dominate the corporation until the PLLC’s introduction. As late as 1890, long after
the introduction of general incorporation in all three countries, some three-quarters of new firms organized as
an ordinary partnership. The legal rules for partnerships were similar in these three civil-law countries. The
cross-country variation in the role of the corporation reflects, largely, specific rules about the corporation in
each country. The 1884 corporation reform in Germany reduced the corporation’s attractiveness for smaller
firms by requiring costly formation and governance mechanisms. Spain, on other hand, afforded remarkable
flexibility to its corporation, making the form relatively easy to tailor to smaller enterprises. The new forms
displace both partnerships and corporations, although the PLLC’s precise impact on the older forms differs
across countries (Guinnane et al. 2007). Some of these differences reflect variations in the corporation, while
others reflect the specific features of the national PLLC and the degree to which it offered entrepreneurs new
organizational possibilities (Guinnane and Rosenthal 2014).15
12 Britain’s first (1844) general incorporation Act required unlimited liability; the 1855 Act allowed general incorporation for
enterprises with limited liability.
13 In theory a partner with unlimited liability can limit his liability for specific obligations contractually, by agreement with
a creditor. We see no systematic evidence this occurred in the period we contemplate. Such contracting would be impractical
for the informal, short-term trade credit emphasized in the literature, and would be impossible as a limitation on tort liability.
Posner (2007, p.422) notes that negotiated limited liability entails considerable transactions costs: "In principle, the enterprise
could include in all its contracts with customers and suppliers a clause limiting its liability to the assets of the enterprise. But
the negotiation of such waivers would be costly. And it would be utterly impractical to limit most tort liability in this way."
Moreover, creditors might want the firm’s owners to have unlimited liability in lieu of contracting on specific assets as collateral.
More commonly one sees the reverse: the owners with limited liability (such as in a PLLC) waiving the limitation to secure
credit for the firm.
14 The U.K. and the United States did not require registration of partnerships, so analogous data are not available for those
countries.
15 Guinnane and Martínez Rodríguez (2018) use unusual Spanish data to estimate discrete-choice models for the enterprise
form in Spain between 1886 and 1935. Spain’s SRL was a stronger substitute for the partnership than for corporations; these
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One could reasonably object that these figures all pertain to the creation of new firms, and do not weight
by their lifespan or size. Corporations lasted longer and had greater capitalization than other forms. In
addition, corporations were much larger than both partnerships and PLLCs. Thus registration numbers
understate the weight of corporations among operating enterprises. Guinnane and Martínez Rodríguez
(2014), for example, report that corporations accounted for about 90 percent of all investment in new firms
prior to the PLLC’s introduction in that country. Another way to ask whether partnerships were more
or less important than their weight in all new firms would suggest is to ask whether they were limited to
specific areas of the economy. The answer is no. Figure 2 draw on the unusual German census of firms
to show that the partnership forms and the GmbH (the German PLLC) appeared across the spectrum of
economic activities.16 Even in sectors characterized by large firms with substantial fixed capital investment,
we find the GmbH and, more surprisingly, the partnerships. Standard industrial classifications can mislead
by allocating a small firm serving the steel industry to a sector consisting primarily of quite different firms.
This is not what Figure 2 shows, however. Kocka (1982, Table 2) reports that GmbHs accounted for five of
the 100 largest German industrial firms in 1907. Two were steel firms and one was in the chemical industry.
Another seven of these 100 largest industrial firms were partnerships, including two more steel firms as well
as two in the machinery sector.
Corporations account for nearly all of the largest enterprises operating today, but many firms retain
a different organization. Germany in 2014 had only 8,037 corporations in all, out of a total of about 1.03
million multi-owner firms. Far more numerous than corporations were ordinary partnerships (275 thousand),
limited partnerships (150 thousand), and GmbHs (about 526 thousand). Corporate revenues exceeded that
of firms organized in other ways, of course; 91 percent of corporations paid tax on at least 250 million
Euros income in 2014. But the other forms included some of the largest firms – 28 percent of partnerships,
44 percent of limited partnerships, and 40 percent of GmbHs fell into this top tax category. The United
States, as one might expect, has relatively more corporations. In 1997, U.S. entrepreneurs ran about 1.8
million partnerships compared to 4.7 million corporations. Some 2.4 million of the corporations fell into
the “S corporation” category that offers lower tax payments for smaller firms. Even if we ignore the smaller
“S” corporations, there were about 1.3 non-S corporations for every partnership, and 2.7 corporations per
partnership overall. Germany, on the other hand, had about 1 corporation for every 80 partnerships.17
trade-offs reflect specifics of each form’s rules.
16 Figure 2 omits firms organized using a special mining form that was more similar to the GmbH than to the corporation,
the bergrechtliche Gewerkschaft. In principle all firms using this form had to be mines, although in the years prior to the
GmbH some firms apparently pretended to be mines to escape the more stringent rules of the standard corporate form. In
some Continental countries, cooperatives often substituted for for-profit enterprises organized under a different legal form. See
Guinnane (2017b).
17 The German data refer to firms paying the Umsatzsteuer in 2014. See Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 2014, 9.13.1, P. 276. Partnerships in the German data combine the firms organized under the commercial and
civil codes. U.S. data for 1997 from the Historical Statistics of the United States Table Ch1-18, p.3-498. Hannah (2015) reports
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The corporation plays a central role in many modern economies, and occupies a privileged place in
business-history accounts such as Chandler (1997). As we demonstrated, this does not mean other enterprise forms were quantitatively unimportant. Nor does it mean the corporation dominates everywhere.
Perhaps more importantly, partnerships and PLLC forms play a role in the life-cycle of many enterprises
that eventually become corporations. Some firms start life as corporations, but many corporations reflect
the transformation of one or more earlier businesses into a new form. Business histories show that many
nineteenth-century corporations went through many different partnership arrangements before their sometimes reluctant adoption of the corporate form. The partnership often represents the start of a corporation.

3

Extending the corporate-finance literature

All firms, including those organized as partnerships, face the fundamental information and incentive problems
at the heart of the corporate-finance literature. Our analysis treats these problems differently for two
reasons. First, the legal rules for partnerships and other small firms constrain enterprises in ways not true
of corporations. The reverse is also true. Second, the context in which our firms operate mean that the
problems appear in different guises; a partnership, for example, rarely has more than a few owners, while a
public corporation can have many thousands.
Modern corporate finance originated with Berle and Means (1932), who assume an enterprise whose small,
dispersed owners are not its managers and managers who have at most small stakes in the firm they run.
This assumption sets the stage for a long line of work that deals in one way or another with the implications
of less-than-perfectly aligned interests of managers and owners. Grossman and Hart (1982) for instance focus
on the disciplining effect bankruptcy may have on managing agents in a widely held corporation, and the
resulting incentive for managers to take on debt as a signaling device. One can think of the related corporategovernance literature (as do Shleifer et al. (1997)) as dealing with the problem of the firm’s finance providers
assuring a return to their investments. More recent contributions deviate from these assumptions in three
important ways. Leland and Pyle (1977) consider entrepreneurs who invest in the firm they intend to run.
A second strand of the literature demonstrates that many firms have large blockholders whose incentives to
monitor the managers reduce the agency problems Berle and Means stress. These blockholders, of course,
raise the issue of agency problems among different types of owners (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Contrary to
Berle and Mean’s notion of dispersed shareholders, the empirical literature underscores the role of networks
of owners, the family group being perhaps the most important example (for example, La Porta et al. (1999)
and Faccio and Lang (2002); Bertrand and Schoar (2006), Mullins and Schoar (2016)).
much higher numbers of corporations for Germany (and other countries) because he combines corporations per se (the German
Aktiengesellschaft) with PLLCs (the German GmbH).
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These core theoretical issues remain our concern, but they appear in different ways for the firms we
consider. Corporations of course can have a small number of owners, and can restrict the transfer of shares
in various ways. But the firms we contemplate are extremes in both dimensions. There was virtually no
market for equity in partnerships. Changing partners requires in most cases winding-up one firm and creating
another. PLLCs could not list their shares on exchanges, although in principle their owners could sell their
equity. (Many firms organized this way also contractually restricted the sale of shares by, for example,
requiring an owner to offer the shares to current owners before selling to an outsider.) The firms we have in
mind typically have a small number of owners, one or more of whom may also manage the firm. In many
corporations, dispersed ownership creates collective-action problems among shareholders that can frustrate
efforts to assert influence on the managers. Most partnerships and PLLCs had only a few owners. Rosenthal
and Lamoreaux (2005, Table 2) report that seventy-one percent of new firms had only two partners in France
in the period 1832-1843. In the period 1885-1936, sixty-two percent of new Spanish ordinary partnerships
had two owners. Only eight percent had more than four owners. Spanish PLLCs (1920-1936) were only
slightly larger, with thirteen percent having more than four owners. Legal rules allowed the owners of such
firms to craft highly firm- and owner-specific governance rules, making it possible for a single, even minority
owner to have veto power over specific decisions. Other, more common rules forbade the firm from taking
certain actions (such as borrowing) without permission from a given set of owners. These rules of course can
be mimicked to some extent in a corporate setting with multiple share classes and other complex votingrights schemes. In a small firm that is established with specific owners in mind, the rules can be crafted very
specifically.
Second, following the seminal contribution by Jensen and Meckling (1976), "capital structure" in the
corporate finance literature primarily means the choice between equity and debt, even when extended to
different types of equity. The firms we study also face trade-offs between equity and debt, but in a different
way. Historical firms made much more use of financing approaches that receive less attention in the corporatefinance literature because they play a comparatively minor role in the modern corporation. Capital can be
locked-in; equity partners can be given managing rights; capital may be pledged but unpaid. These choices
create bundles of rules not usually contemplated by the corporate finance literature that, however, allow
small enterprises to solve the relevant information problems in ways that the standard equity-debt choice
may not.
The corporate-finance (and accounting) literatures sometimes stress the importance of reporting rules
and, in general, how transparent the corporation is with its owners. Restricting important information can
allow managers to abuse owners. The legal rules for partnerships generally provide for complete access to the
firm’s ledgers for general partners and for the owners of PLLCs. (Limited partners may be more restricted).
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Historically, mandatory disclosure rules arise in the context of regulating and reforming corporation law.
Issues pertaining to managerial compensation and entrenchment have a parallel in our context, but again,
there are important differences. Partners often worked for their firm, and there were doubtless questions of
an owner’s salary versus that same owner’s return on his investment. But the setting rules out many of the
questions that have arisen in connection with corporate managerial compensation. For example, our owners
have little reason to inflate earnings to drive up the value of their equity; even if they could do so, there is
essentially no market for their equity investment.18

4

Capital structure for the partnership

This section uses five different, simple models to address the five questions outlined in the introduction.
Each model presumes an entrepreneur with fixed wealth, someone empowered to make all of the firm’s
capitalization decisions. We assume the firm has given capitalization needs and seeks the best way to provide
those needs. Each model makes different informational and solution assumptions, to suit the question. We
adapt models developed in other contexts to understand the particular problems of the partnership’s capital
structure.

4.1

The entrepreneur’s capital investment: why not diversify?

We begin by asking why an entrepreneur invests a large fraction of his personal wealth in the firm. This
arrangement is the heart of the ordinary partnership. We observe this pattern even when diversification is
simple. The historical data available to us does not allow us to see how much of a person’s total wealth
is invested in a firm, but we can compare partnership investments to average per- capita income in some
contexts.19 The observation is all the more puzzling when we note that many entrepreneurs also work for
the firm: they are risking both assets and labor income.
We argue that by pledging his assets instead of diversifying, the entrepreneur can demonstrate his “type”
to investors.20 This holds true for both single-owner firms and partnerships. Our models assume a set of
18 Ordinarily partnerships and PLLCs are free to publicize financial results only to the extent they choose; public reporting
requirements pertain only to corporations or to enterprises that list bonds on public markets. Baskin (1997) traces financial
reporting in the United States to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s efforts (1887) to force railroads to use standard
reporting rules. Vigorous financial reporting was a central part of the reforms reflected in the German Corporation Act of 1884,
but this was an exception at the time, and the reporting was intended to benefit shareholders rather than a broader public.
The English Companies Act (1862) requires statements for stockholders, but does so in a set of default rules (Guinnane, Harris,
and Lamoreaux (2017)). Companies can (and did) decline to provide stockholders with information on the firm’s condition.
See Guinnane et al. (2017).
19 Spanish GDP per capita in 1900 was about 805 (1900) pesetas. The median capitalization per partner in an ordinary
Spanish partnership in that year was about 2900 pesetas.
20 Our model differs from Leland and Pyle (1977) in that we focus on poorer entrepreneurs who cannot borrow endlessly at
a risk-free rate. Amit et al. (1990) consider a similar problem but stress the lender’s returns.
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financiers who provide either equity or loan capital for the firm. For the smaller enterprises we contemplate,
the credit market took the form of trade credit, raw materials and other inputs provided on terms.21
We start with a risk-averse entrepreneur i with wealth wi < 1 and concave utility function u(·). Entrepreneurs come in types that determine the probability that their firm succeeds. We assume pi ∈ {pL , pH }
is the probability that the firm succeeds, where 0 < pL < pH < 1. The firm requires an upfront investment
of one unit of capital. When successful, the firm pays out πi > 1. If it fails, the project pays out nothing.
The entrepreneur decides what fraction 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 of his wealth wi to invest in his enterprise, and then
approaches financiers for the remainder. The financiers observe si , but not the entrepreneur’s type.22 We
assume interesting projects are scarce relative to the amount of financing available (or alternatively, that
financiers are engaged in Bertrand competition), which imposes a zero-profit condition on the financiers.
Financiers have access to a risk-free investment that returns r0 with certainty.23
The game has two types of equilibria. Entrepreneurs may “pool”, meaning that the financiers treat all
entrepreneurs the same. We present an example of a pooling equilibrium in the appendix. We stress the
more interesting separating equilibria, which allow the entrepreneur to distinguish himself from others by
risking his own assets. Let si (pL ) = 0, si (pH ) = s∗ > 0. The threshold value s∗ is the smallest s that is
unattractive to entrepreneurs of the low type. Let the equilibrium beliefs be P (pi = pL | si = s∗ ) = 0 and
P (pi = pL | si 6= s∗ ) = 1. These beliefs hold true for si = s∗ and si = 0, and are off-path anywhere else.
The financiers offer rates that, given their beliefs, allow them just to break even:

pL rsi 6=s∗ + (1 − pL )(−1) = 0

(1)

pH rs∗ (1 − s∗ ) + (1 − pH )(s∗ − 1) = 0

(2)

The individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints for the two types are:

pH u (π − (1 − s∗ w) rs∗ + (1 − s∗ ) w) + (1 − pH )u ((1 − s∗ )w) ≥ 0

(3)

21 For our purposes, the relevant credit is loans to the firm. Sometimes these were formalized by credit instruments such as
bills of exchange. Often, but not always, these notes were secured by the goods underlying a specific transaction; for example,
if a spinning factory sold yarn to a weaver, the yarn would be the security for the obligation. Holders of these notes could sell
them (“discount”) to banks, in effect taking a short-term loan secured by the note. Lamoreaux (1994) describes the use of note
discounting in New England banks in the mid-nineteenth century. Tilly (1966) focuses on the Rheinland in a similar period.
Bodenhorn (2007) discusses bills of exchange as the primary lending mechanism for a nineteenth-century New York bank. The
bills of exchange probably reflect relatively large loans. Kent (1994, p.58) describes the marketing practices of manufacturers
who sold their goods to retail outfits on credit without such formalities. A different historical literature stresses the practice
of retailers selling goods on credit. Of course, if a tailor or a grocer had to provide credit to make sales, that might increase
his need for credit from suppliers. Kent (1994) notes that many distressed retailers were themselves owed considerable sums by
customers. Johnson (1993) emphasizes the role of credit in retail trade. See also Finn (2016).
22 It may seem unrealistic that the financier observes the share of wealth invested. However, in environments where the
entrepreneur’s wealth is known (or where wealth is relatively constant across the population of entrepreneurs) knowing the
share invested is equivalent to knowing the amount invested. A similar argument holds with CRRA utility.
23 In what follows we set r = 0 for convenience.
0
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pL u (π − rsi 6=s∗ + w) + (1 − pL )u (w) ≥ 0
pH u (π − (1 − s∗ w) rs∗ + (1 − s∗ ) w) + (1 − pH )u ((1 − s∗ )w)

(4)

(5)

≥ pH u (π − rsi 6=s∗ + w) + (1 − pH )u (w)
pL u (π − rsi 6=s∗ + w) + (1 − pL )u (w)

(6)

≥ pL u (π − (1 − s∗ w) rs∗ + (1 − s∗ ) w) + (1 − pL )u ((1 − s∗ )w)
If these conditions hold (and it is easy to give simple parametric examples where they do), then the model
has a separating equilibrium for this and, often, for other values of s. All separating equilibria satisfy the
Spence-Mirrlees condition: low-quality entrepreneurs cannot mimic high-quality entrepreneurs. The various
separating equilibria differ only in the interest rate charged and thus the division of surplus.
The separating equilibrium offers a simple explanation for why we see entrepreneurs investing their own
wealth in their venture instead of diversifying.24 By taking on more liability, (rich) investors credibly signal
their type to financiers and therefore receive cheaper financing. Spulber (2009, Chapter 7) uses a moralhazard approach, instead of the adverse-selection model we present. But his result has the same flavor;
wealthy entrepreneurs can better obtain financing, in his model, because risking their own wealth disciplines
their conduct. Another strand in this literature assumes a risk-averse entrepreneur and studies how moral
hazard affects project selection (Lambert (1986)). With a risk-averse entrepreneur and moral hazard, project
type selection can also be skewed.
This model shows that the entrepreneur can use his wealth wi to signal his type. But not all entrepreneurs
have the financial means to engage in this form of signaling.25 To the extent that some high-type entrepreneurs lack the assets necessary to show their commitment to their firm, there may be good ideas that
go unexploited. The next model considers a way for poorer investors to circumvent this problem.

4.2

Why have partners instead of hands-off investors?

In section 4.1 we contemplate an entrepreneur who has to convince uninformed creditors of his type. Many
firms consist of investors drawn from a small social circle. The “small circle” takes several forms. The
economics literature has shown considerable interest in the general phenomena of trade and other economic
activity occurring within tightly-defined, often diaspora, social groups. Greif’s (1991, 1993) account of the
24 The fraction of wealth an entrepreneur invests signals his confidence in his own firm. For sufficiently small p , this result
L
holds even for risk-neutral entrepreneurs. However, the entrepreneur’s risk aversion amplifies the conclusion.
25 Our entrepreneur invests a share of his wealth; Belenzon et al. (2017) explore the use of eponymy as another way to signal
entrepreneur quality, in this case via reputational costs for the entrepreneur. In the tight social settings that we contemplate,
the entrepreneur is automatically associated with his enterprise.
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Maghribi traders focuses on a relatively small, closed social group that shares an ethno-religious identity.
Trivellato (2009) stresses kin alliances within Livorno’s Sephardic community. More generally, family members often provide investments to firms. Marrying a wealthy woman to obtain a dowry is one version of the
practice.26 Ben-Porath’s (1980) seminal discussion of the “F connection” stresses that family members know
more about one another than do strangers. Hilt and O’Banion (2009, Table 6) report for New York State
in 1853 that about 54 percent of ordinary partnerships included at least two close relatives. About forty
percent of ordinary partnerships formed in Spain in the period 1886-1936 had some owners who were close
relatives. Family members comprised the entire partnership in more than one-quarter of firms. In Egypt
in the period 1910-1949, about twenty-eight percent of all new general partnerships included related owners
(Artunç 2018).27 This common pattern seems natural. But it should surprise: if family members informally
share risk, they should be diversifying their activities instead of relying on the the same enterprise.
Tight social connections can affect the organization of firms in several ways. We stress the implications for
the entrepreneur’s ability to attract investment. Assume that the entrepreneur knows people who have some
individual wealth, and who are known to have private signals about his quality. These potential partners
may be better-informed about the entrepreneur because of specialized knowledge about an industry, because
of where they live, or because they know the entrepreneur personally. In the interest of comparability, we
keep assumptions and notation as close as possible to those used in section 4.1. The entrepreneurs are
risk-neutral, have wealth wi and a given ability pi ∈ {pL, pH }, 0 < pL < pH < 1, that denotes the likelihood
of their project succeeding. These projects again require a fixed investment of 1 unit of capital and deliver
πi > 1 in case of success, and zero otherwise. Each entrepreneur i knows one potential partner Pi with
wealth W . A potential partner gets a private signal M ∈ {G, B} of the entrepreneur’s ability. These signals
are informative in the sense that P (M = G | p = pH ) = P (M = B | p = pL ) = q where q > 12 . To simplify
the algebra, in the example below we assume the partner’s utility function is given by u(c) = log(c).28
The potential partners have the option of joining the firm and adding equity to the entrepreneur’s. The
two owners might be able to finance the firm entirely without outside investments. But we focus on the
more interesting case where the firm still needs additional finance from the credit market. Any remaining
financing comes from loans provided from a pool of uninformed financiers. The financiers have access to safe
investments that provide a fixed return r0 . We assume the partner makes the entrepreneur an offer, based
on the private signal; the entrepreneur then decides whether to accept the partnership offer; finally, the
26 This practice is almost a trope in the business-history literature. James (2006) provides several examples in the early
histories of three important Continental business families.
27 “Relatives” here are persons who are named in the firm’s articles of association as husband, wife, sibling, child, etc. Because
of Spanish naming practices, this source reveals more relationships than might otherwise be the case (for example, married
sisters). However, our estimates of family firms remain a lower bound.
28 The conclusions stated in the text hold regardless of the exact form of the utility function. See Appendix section A.2
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uninformed financier observes the decisions of the partner and the entrepreneur, and offers the entrepreneur
residual financing.
We start with the decision by the potential partners to invest a share si in the venture. We verify below
that for wealth levels wi ≤ w̄, where w̄ is some threshold level, entrepreneurs go ahead with the project
regardless of whether the success probability is high or low. Thus an entrepreneur with little wealth cannot
credibly reveal his “high” type. For poor entrepreneurs the potential partner has to rely entirely on the
private signal. For M = G, P (success) = qpH + (1 − q)pL . Conditional on receiving a good signal, the
partner Pi maximizes his expected earnings by investing a share sG , by solving
maxsG (pH q + pL (1 − q)) · log [π · sG W + (1 + r0 ) (1 − sG ) W ]

(7)

+ (1 − pH q − pL (1 − q)) · log [(1 + r0 ) (1 − sG ) W ]
This yields
sG =

(pH q + pL (1 − q)) π − (1 + r0 )
π − (1 + r0 )

(8)

sB =

(pL q + pH (1 − q)) π − (1 + r0 )
π − (1 + r0 )

(9)

and similarly, if the signal is bad,

For values of wi > w̄, only high-ability entrepreneurs invest. Since potential partner observes the entrepreneur’s wealth, he instead solves

max pH log (πW s + (1 + r0 ) (1 − s) W ) + (1 − pH ) log ((1 + r0 ) W (1 − s))
s

(10)

so the share of his wealth the partner invests is

sW =

pH π − (1 + r0 )
π − (1 + r0 )

(11)

Next, we turn to the entrepreneur’s decision to accept a partner. We assume here (and verify separately)
that in equilibrium, the entrepreneur accepts all partnership offers. This means the entrepreneur obtains
capital from his partners equal to
KP = sG W

(12)

KP = sW W

(13)

for w < w̄ and
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above.
Now consider the potential lender. The entrepreneur faces a funding gap of 1 − wi − KP , which the
credit market fills. We assume that the credit provider observes both the entrepreneur’s wealth wi , and the
partner’s contribution si . For entrepreneurs with wealth less than w̄, the credit provider uses Bayes’ rule to
estimate p̂, the probability that the entrepreneur is of high quality:

p̂ = q

(14)

where p̂ = P (p = pH | M = G). The financier’s zero-profit condition implies a required rate of return of

1+r =

1 + r0
qpH + (1 − q) pL

(15)

For entrepreneurs with wealth above w̄, however, the credit provider knows that the entrepreneur is of the
high type, and instead offers credit at interest rate

1+r =

1 + r0
pH

(16)

The richer entrepreneur (those with wealth above w̄) receives lower interest-rate offers, due to the lack
of uncertainty over his type. Finally, the entrepreneur decides whether to accept the financier’s offer. An
entrepreneur accepts a credit offer if and only if

pi (π (1 − KP ) − (1 + r) (1 − KP )) − (1 − pi ) wi ≥ 0

(17)

That is, whenever
pi ≥ 

wi


π (1 − KP ) − 1 +

1+r0
q·pH +(1−q)pL



(1 − KP ) + wi



(18)

This expression is increasing in wi , and reduces to the trivial condition pi ≥ 0 when wi = 0. For small
levels of wealth, the entrepreneur goes ahead with the project no matter how unlikely success is, since his
downside risk is very small. For larger values of wi , however, the inequality in (18) holds for pH , but not pL ,
so that wealthy individuals only become entrepreneurs when their success chances are large.
When entrepreneurs cannot signal quality with their own wealth, they must find other ways to contend
with the adverse selection problem. Poor entrepreneurs who have the right connections can do this by
letting (positive) private signals substitute for the commitment their own capital implies.29 In the absence
29 Even in modern economies, investors may rely on signals from other outside but connected investors. Shane and Cable
(2002, p.369) study the tight social networks involved in gathering information prior to investing seed money in contemporary
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of informed partners, poor entrepreneurs cannot signal their quality because the financiers know that all poor
entrepreneurs will invest, regardless of the project’s quality. The partners play two distinct roles: they supply
capital on their own, and they provide information about the entrepreneur to the broader capital market.
The model implies that some potential entrepreneurs have high-quality projects but lack either personal
wealth or informed potential partners. It follows that some firms are “missing:” some valuable projects
cannot be undertaken because of information limitations. The model implies predicts that an industry with
relatively high capital requirements or a technology that is new or opaque to potential investors will have
many such missing firms. Connected firms are thus a mix of very productive firms that need not rely on
inside capital and marginally productive firms that without inside capital would not have been created at
all.30
A variant on the limited partnership allowed the passive investor to remain secret. German commercial
law (among others) makes a sharp distinction between a limited partner, who was a member of a firm called
a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft), and a silent partnership (stille Gesellschaft, or sG). The
limited partnership constitutes a firm. The names and capital contributions of all limited partners appear in
the firm’s entry at the commercial registry, which is a public document. Because a silent partnership (sG), on
the other hand, refers to an investment relationship, not a firm, no record of this investment need appear in
public documents. One party to an sG makes a limited-liability investment in the other’s activities, earning
a share of profits instead of a fixed return as with a loan contract. The relationship can exist between any
combination of natural or legal persons. A single firm could have distinct, silent investments from multiple
investors who might not know of one another. Given the lack of registration, empirical studies cannot pin
down how often sGs were known to others, or even if multiple investors in a single firm knew of each other’s
existence.
The distinction suggests a wrinkle to the thinking that underlies this section. The stille Gesellschaft relationship rested on a contract that the entrepreneur could presumably show to others, so a silent partnership
arrangement could function in the way our model contemplates. But it might be used in other ways. The
investor might want to conceal his wealth. He might also worry that public knowledge of the investment
would cause problems for other relationships. For example, an investor might want to provide capital to
firm A but still do business with firm A’s competitors. A desire to invest discreetly also reflects the easy
U.S. technology start-ups. One investor reported, for instance, “We made our investment largely because of [PERSON G]. We
figured that he had better information than us on [ENTREPRENEUR F] and if he believed in [ENTREPRENEUR F], then
we should too.” Firms based on social connections may also behave differently because they have different objectives, Recent
survey evidence shows that family entrepreneurs are more inclined to look out for the interests of other stakeholders, including
creditors (Mullins and Schoar, 2016). In our model, the connectedness does not change the entrepreneur’s objectives, it just
signals quality.
30 Some accounts of family firms indicate that they are on average less productive than other firms (Bertrand and Schoar
(2006)). The existence of these “missing” firms -and the selection effect they create- would explain this result.
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transmission of information in a small social world.31
The previous two models considered the role of contractual choices in making capital available to the
right kind of entrepreneur. The next three models explore ways in which contractual choices can discipline
the behavior of managing partners within the firm.

4.3

What is the role of unpaid capital?

Unpaid capital was ubiquitous in enterprises in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the Spanish
firms registered 1885-1936, thirteen percent of limited partnerships and PLLCs have at least some unpaid
capital. For corporations the figure rises to fifty-four percent. The rules for creating a German GmbH
explicitly contemplated unpaid capital. The law required a minimum total capitalization of 20,000 Marks,
but only one-quarter of that sum had to be paid in before the firm could operate.32
We focus on the problem of ex post verification. Verification problems could arise in the form of fraudulent
bankruptcy or an inability to determine whether a project had succeeded. Geographically separated partners
might not fully know the firm’s condition.33 An investor and an entrepreneur must decide whether to invest
1 unit each in a project that succeeds with probability p (which is known to both players) and if successful
pays out profit π > 2. If the project fails, the payout is zero. For simplicity, we assume that profits are
shared equally. The timing is as follows: first, the investor decides whether to invest in the project; then,
the uncertainty is realized; and finally, in case of success, the entrepreneur announces whether the project
was a success. The unpaid capital functions much like collateral in a lending model. We focus first on the
entrepreneur’s uncalled capital. There are two cases: (i) the no-collateral case and (ii) the collateral case.
The entrepreneur announces a profit of πa . Under (i), the entrepreneur earns π −
the investor earns

πa
2 .

πa
2

in case of success, and

Under (ii), the entrepreneur pledges some collateral C before the project is undertaken,

31 The distinction between the limited partnership and the sG appears after the 1808 French Code de Commerce, which does
not mention the latter. According to that code, the limited partners’ names could not be part of the firm’s name, and there was
no commercial registry, so, as Kessler (2003) stresses, the limited partners’ identity could be kept secret. The 1794 Prussian
Allgemeine Landrecht uses the French term for a limited partnership (Société en commandite) and the German term stille
Gesellschaft to mean the same thing. The distinction appears clearly in the 1861 all-German commercial code.
32 The firm could also stipulate the ability to demand that owners make capital contributions in excess of their original
investment, even if fully paid in. Our model sets aside several issues important in specific times and places. The logic of unpaid
capital for corporations resembles the ideas we lay out in the text, but the practice involved additional difficulties with large
numbers of dispersed shareholders. Some corporations issued limited-liability shares with unpaid capital available under terms
specified in the firm’s articles of association. Others issued limited-liability shares with an extra “reserve” liability available
to creditors only if the firm went bankrupt. Some nineteenth-century observers argued that unpaid capital was unlikely to
be available to firms in trouble, because investors would sell such shares to impecunious individuals for whom capital calls
meant nothing. (The same issue, of course, arises with unlimited liability.) Turner (2009) discusses these liability regimes for
British banks, stressing legal and firm-level impediments to the strategic sale of shares subject to additional capital calls. For
the GmbH’s ability to demand extra capital payments, see Germany (1892, §26-28). The U.S. National Banking Act (1863)
required national banks to have double liability for shares until 1933. Many states adopted a similar provision for state banks.
Macey and Miller (1992) view the requirement as a success, because over the life of the law, more than half of the additional
levies were successfully extracted from owners of affected banks. Grossman (2001) shows that double liability reduced bank
risk-taking but did not guarantee bank stability in the face of systematic shocks. See Grossman and Imai (2015) for additional
evidence on British banks.
33 Unpaid capital could also alleviate selection and moral hazard problems. Success need not be literally unobservable. Courts
may have trouble enforcing claims even if success or failure is relatively straightforward to observe.

19

and if he announces the failure of the project, C is lost. In case of success, payoffs are π −
πa 6= π, or π −

πa
2

and

πa
2

πa
2

− C and

πa
2

if

otherwise.34

We start with the no collateral case, (i). The entrepreneur’s payoff is π −
announcing failure yields a strictly greater payoff of π >

π
2.

πa
2 .

In the case of success,

Thus the entrepreneur will always claim the

project is a failure. Anticipating this, no investor will join the venture, since the return is −1. This dismal
result implies that in the presence of ex-post verification problems, worthwhile projects (those for which,
p · π ≥ 2) will not be undertaken. Now introduce collateral, as in (ii). If the project fails, the entrepreneur
loses C, and his payoff from announcing success is − π2 . So long as C ≥

π
2,

the entrepreneur always wants

to announce the truth. Knowing this, the investor will invest whenever it is social optimal to do so; his
expected payoff is p · π2 .35
Unpaid capital lies at the heart of partnership arrangements. Until recently, all partnerships had at
least one owner with fully unlimited liability; this is a form of unpaid capital. This model demonstrates the
role of this arrangement. Investors may be reluctant to contribute in cases where an entrepreneur can easily
(and falsely) claim failure. Extending liability beyond the entrepreneur’s paid-in contribution makes truthful
revelation incentive-compatible, and can therefore be useful even in the extreme case when the collateral is
entirely useless to the investor.36 The institution of unpaid capital reduces the number and types of missing
firms. Worthwhile business ventures might not attract capital if ex-post verification limitations make it easy
for managers to embezzle or otherwise put their interests before the firm’s.
This model shows how legal form can discipline a single managing partner. The next model considers
conflicting incentives with multiple managing partners

4.4

Ordinary versus limited partners

In most jurisdictions an entrepreneur could take on a partner in one of two ways: as an ordinary or a
limited partner. The literature on limited partnerships stresses different aspects of their appeal to investors.
Kessler (2003) emphasizes the attractiveness of an investment that could be anonymous and did not involve
34 This is equivalent to saying that the collateral has no value to the investor (clearly an extreme assumption); a more realistic
version is that some fraction of C is transferred to the investor. However, this only makes the use of pledged capital more
appealing. If the capital was of value to the investor in “bankruptcy,” then the collateral would reduce the ex post verification
problem ex ante and help to make the investor whole in the case of failure. We abstract from any problems a creditor may
have in getting the unpaid capital.
35 The entrepreneur’s participation constraint p · π + (1 − p) · (−C) ≥ 1 must also hold. This constraint requires that the
2
success probability be large enough to compensate the entrepreneur for the risk of losing C.
36 Our argument holds even if investors could not meet their capital calls either because they had suffered a wealth shock or
because their assets were too illiquid. Uncalled capital has the incentive effects we model as long as the investor has something
to lose. That is why we stress ordinary partners, who operate the firm. Some historical accounts emphasize the impact of
unpaid capital on leverage: uncalled capital reassured creditors, who knew that the firm could call on more capital in the
bankruptcy state. Our argument deals with the entrepreneur’s incentives as well as the other investor’s willingness to invest.
The entrepreneur’s incentives are irrelevant to the leverage argument; the firm’s bankruptcy could result from simple “bad luck.”
Unpaid capital pledged by limited partners would be relevant to this concern. Unpaid capital has a further benefit, if there is
an opportunity cost to investment in the firm.
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a role in managing the firm. The French limited partnership’s “primary purpose was to facilitate investment
by wealthy noblemen who were fearful that public disclosure of their involvement in the base practice
of commerce would jeopardize their noble status.” (p.512) She stresses the difference between the French
société en commandite simple and the analogous form introduced into New York state in 1822, suggesting that
limited liability in the French version was relatively unimportant.37 The New York form, crucially, offered
limited liability to some investors. Hilt and O’Banion (2009) studied the New York limited partnership over
the four decades from its inception. Limited partners often knew the general partners in a given firm, but in
comparison to ordinary partnerships were less likely to be kin. Limited partners used the form to invest in a
number of different firms, allowing hands-off investments and diversification beyond what could be achieved
as a general partner. The Spanish limited partnership also relied less heavily on kin ties among owners than
its ordinary counterpart.
The two kinds of partners differ in two dimensions; here we focus on the fact that another ordinary partner
can help run the firm, while a limited partner cannot. The problem is interesting in both the perfect- and
the imperfect-information environment.

4.4.1

When partner quality is observable

Consider the perfect information case first. The firm’s success probability Pi is the product of an entrepreneur’s ability pi and the ability of up to n partners, Pi = pi · Πnj=1 pj . If not all spots in the team are
filled, this is equivalent to hiring “dummy partners” of some low ability p0 . The (risk-neutral) entrepreneur
and each (risk-neutral) potential partner have one unit of capital to invest, and an outside option whose
return is normalized to zero. If the projects succeeds, the firm earns π > n; if it fails, the firm earns nothing
at all.
The entrepreneur knows his own skill level. If he also can observe the skill levels of all m > n potential
partners, then the model is slightly trivial but serves as a benchmark. The timing is as follows: the entrepreneur offers some subset of the potential partners (at most n) a place in the firm, and then all partners
offered a place must simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the offer. To maximize Pi = pi ·Πnj=1 pj ,
the entrepreneur accepts any partner with an ability level of pj ≥ p0 as managing partner; if there are more
than n such individuals, the entrepreneur chooses the n highest skilled ones. Each partner, including the
entrepreneur, earns

1
n
n pi · Πj=1 pj

· π. Since ability is observable and being a managing partner entails no cost,

it is in the interest of any chosen partner j to accept an active role in the firm if and only if pj ≥ p0 .
37 Studies of the early-modern Florentine limited partnership offer a warning about the specificity of enterprise forms; variations
on limited-partnership rules could be extensive. Goodman (1981, p. 426) notes that the early-modern accomandita required
registration of all partner names, while Litchfield (1969, p.696) stress that “no legal obstacle prevented Florentine nobles from
investing in companies or even taking part in the management of great Florentine companies for several generations.” Carmona
(1964) argues, for a slightly earlier period, that limited liability was the essential feature of the limited partnership in Florence.

21

4.4.2

Imperfectly observable partner quality

A more interesting problem arises if the entrepreneur cannot perfectly observe the quality of the potential
managing partners; now the choice between managing and limited partners is not trivial. Managing partners
contribute skills to the firm and therefore can help it succeed, but the addition of multiple partners may make
the moral hazard problems worse.38 The intuition for this result rests on the fact that multiple managing
partners cannot be made the single residual claimant; therefore the first-best solution cannot be achieved.
Consider a firm with two managing partners, indexed by i and j. The success probability reflects not just
fixed abilities, but incorporates the effort levels, ei and ej respectively. Individuals differ by their cost-ofeffort functions Ci (ei ) and Cj (ej ). The success probability is now determined both by the (privately chosen)
effort levels and the (privately known) abilities, as embodied in the cost-of-effort functions. Holmstrom (1982,
Theorem 1) shows that it is impossible to allocate the profit that leads to a balanced budget, generates the
optimal effort levels, and is a Nash equilibrium. With imperfect information about the contribution of the
managing partners, limited partners become more appealing.39
These limitations do not, of course, imply that in a world of imperfect information, multiple ordinary
partners were rare. Some investors insisted on an ordinary partnership as the price of their capital or some
other input. Before cheap transportation and communication, the best way for a firm to operate in more than
one locale at once might require personnel physically located in two or more places. One way to organize
such firms would be a sole proprietorship or limited partnership with one managing partner, and employees
in the other locations. But we know of many partnerships where the several ordinary partners each lived
in a different place; the point here is not that we never see multiple managing partners, it is simply that
information imperfections reduce the number of managing partners relative to the first best.
The preceding models focus on the managing partner’s incentives or quality. The next, and final, model
shows that legal form also disciplines the enterprise’s non-managing partners and other investors.

4.5

Locked-in capital

The corporate-finance literature also ignores the issue of capital lock-in. This omission is natural; all corporations lock in capital.40 But partnerships do not. Locked-in capital refers to the inability of any owner to
retrieve his investment from the firm directly. If a corporate shareholder wants to liquidate the investment,
38 Here we are implicitly abstracting away from enforceable contracts that limit decision-making to a subset of partners, or
that require unanimous consent for certain decisions. In some jurisdictions a partnership’s articles of association could include
such provisions and they would bind on the firm’s owners.
39 This discussion focuses on potential managing partners’ skill and effort. Additional complications may arise if potential
managing partners have unequal levels of wealth, since wealthier partners may be more attractive creditor targets in the case
of bankruptcy.
40 Some corporate-law scholars argue that capital lock-in is the essential feature of corporations and has been neglected in
earlier accounts. See Stout (1999), and Blaire (2003).
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his only option is to sell the share to someone else. This feature has two related implications. Firms with
locked-in capital are more suitable to projects that require a long stream of investment before any return
can be expected. The lock-in feature amounts to a commitment device for the investors. Capital lock-in also
obviates the potential for hold-up that afflicts forms such as partnerships, which are effectively at-will. A
partner who wants to withdraw his investment can generally do so. Because of this, owners of partnerships
are always subject to possible hold-up by their partners. Shifting from a partnership to an enterprise form
that locks in capital amounts to a significant adjustment of capital structure, and represents an important
feature of corporations and similar forms. The several countries that introduced PLLC forms in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all viewed them slightly differently. The German GmbH resembled
a corporation somewhat more than the French SARL, for example. But all of these forms shared a common
feature that corporations had and partnerships lacked: they locked-in capital, just as in a corporation.41
For simplicity, we focus here on lock-in for the non-managing partner, although the same logic applies
to all owners. Assume the entrepreneur, E, and his potential partner, P , each have one unit of capital.
The firm needs two units of capital to operate, one in period 1 and one in period 2. In period 3, the firm
generates revenues π > 2, leaving a profit of π − 2 to be shared. This return requires an investment of at
least one unit of capital in each period; with smaller investments the return is 0. In the case without lock-in,
the timing is as follows: in period 1, E decides whether to invest or not. In period 2, P offers his capital to
E, and then E decides whether to accept.42 In period 3, payoffs are realized. Figure 1 shows the game tree
for this game.
In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, P knows that E in period 2 will accept any
offer that leaves him with a payoff greater than −1, and will therefore offer to keep the entire return π,
giving payoffs for the entrepreneur and partner respectively of (−1, π − 1). Knowing this, E will not invest
in the firm in period 1, even though it would be socially optimal to do so. P ’s inability to commit keeps this
profitable enterprise from being undertaken.
Now consider the case where P has to make his offer to E in period 1, without a chance to renegotiate in
period 2. To induce E to accept, P will offer to keep π − 1, leaving E indifferent between investing and not
investing. The venture will then be undertaken, leading to payoffs (0, π − 2). Therefore, locking in capital
prevents partners from exploiting the hold-up problem inherent in running firms; removing the threat of
hold-up expands the number of worthwhile businesses undertaken, reducing the number of missing firms.
Institutional innovations such as the corporation or PLLC, because they lock in capital, support better use
41 Guinnane et al. (2007) discuss the more general problem of “untimely dissolution,” which reflects the identity of a partnership
with specific individuals. One partner’s death can trigger the firm’s demise. Hold-up in our sense is a type of untimely dissolution
that reflects strategic behavior.
42 Note that this is equivalent to P putting his capital into the firm in period 1, but being allowed to take it out without
penalty in period 2 with a chance to renegotiate the agreement.
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of resources. This is particularly important in industries that rely on continued investment, large up-front
outlays, or only pay out profits after a long period of time.43

5

Conclusions

This paper draws on and extends simple models from the economics of information and incentives to study
the firm’s choices concerning equity and debt. We focus on the smaller firms that were crucial to nowadvanced economies from before industrialization until the early twentieth century. Our analysis starts from
the assumption that the core information and incentive problems are the same for all enterprises, regardless
of legal form. These problems affect capital structure differently both because of legal rules that constrain the
two classes of enterprises differently, and because of broader differences in the environments the firms face.
Each of our models generates an equilibrium in which the firm has specific classes of equity and debt. Given
the legal rules, these capital-structure decisions also imply an enterprise form; for example, only limited
partnerships can create limited-liability equity in a partnership setting.
Our results help elucidate themes from the business-history and other literatures, and in some cases
point to new avenues of research. The first model (section 4.1) explains why entrepreneurs usually invest
much of their own wealth in their firms, even though such decisions violate common-sense notions about
diversification. The model also helps to explain why wealthy entrepreneurs do better and can have larger
firms; the scale reflects both their own wealth and their ability to attract outside funding by investing in their
firm and thus signaling their quality. The second model (section 4.2) turns to the issue of social connections
and their role in financing firms. The entrepreneur may be too poor to signal the value of his project, but if
there are wealthier people who can observe his quality then those people can invest in the firm and thus allow
hands-off creditors to piggyback on signals they cannot see directly. We know that most early partnerships
combined people from the same social circles or region. This model also implies a novel explanation for a
general phenomenon: the tendency for firms in a given sector to cluster in a region, and for their owners to
come from specific religious or ethnic groups. Regional or ethnic affinity allows connectedness to flourish.
Unpaid capital was an ubiquitous feature of capital structure; an unlimited partner by definition has
unpaid capital, and many firms with limited liability (including corporations) also adopted this structure.
The literature has discussed several reasons for unpaid capital. Our third model (section 4.3) focuses on one:
it disciplines entrepreneurs who might otherwise falsely report the condition of their firm. This result implies
that unpaid capital is particularly important if investors (or, potentially, the courts) know little about the
43 The sectoral differences on display in Figure 2 doubtless reflect forces beyond those contemplated by this model. But it is
worth noting that by 1925, Germany’s GmbH played an important role in a variety of sectors, including those, such as chemicals,
with significant sunk capital.
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firm’s technology or the entrepreneur’s actions. We would expect to see reliance on unpaid capital in the
new and relatively opaque sectors that characterized industrialization.
Partners can be of two types. In general, ordinary partners assume unlimited liability and can help
manage the firm. While specific roles in governance could be modified by contract, we know that partners
who did not play a role in governance typically took a limited-partner role (section 4.4). The result implies
a trade-off that generates different partnership structures in different settings. When the firms structure
allows good partners to make other good partners better, then multiple managing partners aid the firm. For
example, a commercial firm with four managing partners located in four cities may do better because each
partner can take advantage of opportunities that arise locally and increase sales for the firm as a whole.
This may be true even if one partner is not as good as the others. On the other hand, if a firm’s technology
implies that all managers will be in the same location, then a less-able manager can only reduce the value of
the best managers. However, if geography or technology makes it simple for partners to harm the firm for
private benefit, then the firm will do better with fewer -possible only one- managing partner.
Finally, we considered the problem of hold-up in firms (such as partnerships) that cannot lock in capital
(section 4.5). Accounts of the PLLC forms (such as the GmbH) typically explain the new form’s popularity
by noting that it offered all owners limited liability without the formalities required of corporations. We
stress another feature: the ability to commit to longer-term projects that involved specific capital.
We have argued that there are many choices of enterprise form beyond the simple trade-off of equity and
debt. Entrepreneurs used this flexibility in creating new firms. Corporations were larger than firms organized
in other ways, and they persisted longer. But even after the advent of general incorporation, partnerships
remained more popular than corporations in many jurisdictions. After the PLLC’s introduction, the relative
weights of corporations, partnerships, and the new form shifted again. Table 2 shows this pattern clearly.
The PLLC’s popularity differed across countries in ways that reflect the peculiarities of national law as well
as the existing rules for corporations. But our analysis highlights two general reasons for the shift from the
ordinary partnership to the PLLC. The PLLC’s flexibility makes it possible for the entrepreneur, as in our
models, to risk much of his own wealth to demonstrate his ability to other investors. The PLLC improves on
the partnership, however, by allowing investors to actively manage the firm and still limit their liability. This
partially relaxes the trade-off that underlies our analysis of ordinary versus limited partners. Perhaps most
importantly, PLLCs can lock in capital and those do not face the threat of hold-up and untimely dissolution
that limits a partnership’s ability to invest in certain kinds of projects. Guinnane and Martínez Rodríguez
(2018) show that larger firms and firms especially vulnerable to dissolution costs (such as those in mining and
other sectors with sunk investments) preferred the corporation. Their estimates imply that in the absence
of the Spanish PLLC, about one-third of the actual PLLCs would have organized as corporations. This
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high figure probably reflects Spain’s flexible corporation rules. Most importantly, they report a placebo tests
demonstrating that firms indeed saw enterprise form as an object of choice: replacing the firm’s actual form
with a randomly-assigned form (a type of placebo) results in dramatically weaker model fit.
This article contributes to understanding why entrepreneurs chose specific enterprise forms, stressing the
capital-structure decisions that play an important role in the corporate-finance literature. The information
and incentive problems that underlie our models have been studied extensively, but to our knowledge,
these ideas have not been used to understand the choice of enterprise form. The few economic studies
of partnerships and corporations tend to focus on single features to understand the role of, for example,
particular kinds of capital investment, abstracting from the broader but essential features of the differing
enterprise forms. Most legal discussions of enterprise have stressed either taxation issues (which are clearly
important, although not in the period we stress), or the attractiveness of anonymous investments to nobles
and others unwilling to have their names attached to firms. While setting aside some issues that mattered
to the entrepreneur’s choices, we have provided an analysis that begins to flesh out the economic analysis of
enterprise form choice.
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Appendix
A.1 An example of pooling equilibria in Model 1
Let P (pi = pL ) = 0.5 for simplicity. One pooling equilibrium occurs for si = 0 regardless of type, P (pi =
pL | si = 0) = 0.5 and P (pi = pL | si > 0) = 1. The first of these beliefs is true in equilibrium, and the
second is off the equilibrium path. Next consider a financier’s decision to deviate. Given his beliefs, the zero
(expected) profit condition pins down the rates they can offer to any entrepreneur investing either si = 0 or
si > 0
.5(pH rsi =0 + (1 − pH )(−1)) + .5(pL rsi =0 + (1 − pL )(−1)) = 0

(19)

pL rsi >0 + (1 − pL )(−1) = 0

(20)

and therefore he has no profitable deviation available. Finally, the entrepreneur (regardless of type) does
not have a profitable deviation either, since investing si > 0 increases his risk and also worsens the rate he
has access to. Thus, this combination of beliefs and strategies is an equilibrium. It is however not unique.

A.2 Model 2 with risk-neutral partners
The entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, have zero wealth and a given ability pi ∈ {pL, pH }, 0 < pL < pH < 1,
that denotes the likelihood of their project succeeding. These projects again require a fixed investment of
1 unit of capital and deliver πi > 1 in case of success, and zero otherwise. Each entrepreneur i knows one
potential partner Pi with wealth W . A potential partner gets a private signal, or message, M ∈ {G, B} of
the entrepreneur’s ability. These signals are informative in the sense that P (M = G | p = pH ) = P (M =
B | p = pL ) = q where q > 21 . Partners here are assumed to be risk neutral too.
The potential partners have the option of joining the firm and adding equity to the enterprise. The partner
might be able to finance the firm entirely without outside investments. But we focus on the more interesting
case where the firm still needs additional finance from the credit market. Any remaining financing comes
from loans provided from a pool of uninformed financiers. The financiers have access to safe investments
that provide a fixed return r0 . We assume the partner makes the entrepreneur an offer, based on the private
signal; the entrepreneur then decides whether to accept the partnership offer; finally, the uninformed financier
observes the decisions of the partner and the entrepreneur, and offers the entrepreneur residual financing.
We start with the decision by the potential partners to invest in the venture. For M = G, P (success) =
qpH + (1 − q)pL . Conditional on receiving a good signal, the partner Pi maximizes his expected earnings by
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investing a share sG , by solving
maxsG (pH q + pL (1 − q)) · [π · sG W + (1 + r0 ) (1 − sG ) W ]

(21)

+ (1 − pH q − pL (1 − q)) · [(1 + r0 ) (1 − sG ) W ]
This leads partners to invest his whole wealth if and only if

(pH q + pL (1 − q)) · π ≥ (1 + r0 )

(22)

and similarly, if the signal is bad, they invest their whole wealth if

(pL q + pH (1 − q)) · π ≥ (1 + r0 )

(23)

In other words, partners invest if either the return is large enough or the signal is good enough.
Next, we turn to the entrepreneur’s decision to accept a partner. We assume here (as in the text) that
in equilibrium, the entrepreneur accepts all partnership offers. This means the entrepreneur obtains capital
from his partner equal to
KP = sG W

(24)

Now consider the potential lender. The entrepreneur faces a funding gap of 1 − KP , which the credit
market has to fill. We assume that the credit provider observes only the funding provided by the partner,
KP . The financier’s zero-profit condition implies a required rate of return of

1+r =

1 + r0
p̂

(25)

where p̂ is the financier’s estimated probability of the success of the venture. By observing the partner’s
investment, the financier can deduct that the probability that the entrepreneur is high-skilled. Entrepreneur’s
with partners who know their ability therefore receive lower interest rates from uninformed financiers, if the
entrepreneur is too poor to use his wealth to credibly signal his ability.

A.3 Extending Model 2 to multiple partners
Assume that the entrepreneur knows a group of people who have some individual wealth, and who are
known to have private signals about his quality. These potential partners may be better-informed about the
entrepreneur because of specialized knowledge about an industry, because of where they live, or because they
know the entrepreneur personally. Assume the entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, have wealth wi and a given
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ability pi ∈ {pL, pH } that denotes the likelihood of their project succeeding. These projects require a fixed
investment of 1 unit of capital and deliver πi > 1 in case of success, and zero otherwise. Each entrepreneur
i has a pool of n (risk-averse) potential partners Pij with wealth W . Each of these potential partners gets a
private signal, or message, Mij ∈ {G, B} of the entrepreneur’s ability. These signals are informative in the
sense that P (M = G | p = pH ) = P (M = B | p = pL ) = q where q > 12 .
The partners can provide additional equity themselves. Any remaining financing need comes from loans
provided from a pool of uninformed financiers. Safe assets provide outside options r0 . The timing is as
follows: First, the potential partners simultaneously make their offers, based on their private signal; then,
the entrepreneur decides which ones to accept and reject; finally, the uninformed financier observes the
number and investments of the partners and offers the entrepreneur residual financing. We start with the
decision by the potential partners to invest a share si in the venture.
Note that for wealth levels wi ≤ w̄, entrepreneurs will go ahead with the project regardless of whether
the success probability is high or low. Therefore the poor entrepreneurs cannot distinguish themselves if
their type is high. Therefore, for poor entrepreneurs the potential partners have to rely entirely on private
signals.
For M = G, P (success) = qpH + (1 − q)pL . So, conditional on receiving a good signal, the partner Pij
maximizes his expected earnings by investing

sG =

(pH q + pL (1 − q)) π − (1 + r0 )
π − (1 + r0 )

(26)

sB =

(pL q + pH (1 − q)) π − (1 + r0 )
π − (1 + r0 )

(27)

and similarly, if the signal is bad,

Above w̄, only entrepreneurs with good signals will invest, and since potential partners can observe
wealth, they instead solve

max pH log (πW s + (1 + r0 ) W (1 − s)) + (1 − pH ) log ((1 + r0 ) W (1 − s))
s

(28)

giving a solution of
sW =

pH π − (1 + r0 )
π − (1 + r0 )

(29)

Next, we turn to the entrepreneur’s to accept a partner. We assume here (and verify separately) that in
the equilibrium, the entrepreneur will want to accept all partnership offers. If we call the number of good
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offers nG , this means the entrepreneur gets capital from partners equal to

KP = nG sG W + (n − nG )sB W

(30)

KP = nsW W

(31)

for w < w̄ and

above.
Now consider the potential lender. From above, the entrepreneur is left with a funding gap of 1−wi −KP ,
which the credit market has to fill. We assume that the credit provider observes the entrepreneur’s wealth
wi , the number of potential partners, n, as well as the invested capital share sij of any actual partner j. For
entrepreneurs with wealth less than w̄, the credit provider uses Bayes’ rule estimate to p̂, the probability
that the entrepreneur is of high quality:



n

 nG

 q (1 − q)n−nG · 12
nG



p̂ = 
n
n

 nG



 q (1 − q)n−nG · 21 + 
 (1 − q)nG q n−nG ·
nG
nG

(32)
1
2

where p̂ = P (p = pH | exactly nG signals are good). The financier accordingly offers a required rate of
return of
1+r =

1 + r0
p̂ · pH + (1 − p̂) pL

(33)

which is dictated by the zero profit condition. For entrepreneurs with wealth above w̄, however, the credit
provider knows that the entrepreneur is of the high type, and offers credit at interest rate

1+r =

1 + r0
pH

(34)

Finally, the entrepreneur decides whether to accept the financier’s offer. An entrepreneur accepts a credit
offer if and only if
pi (π (S − KP ) − (1 + r) (1 − KP )) − (1 − pi ) wi ≥ 0

(35)

That is, whenever
pi ≥ 

wi

π (1 − KP ) − 1 +

1+r0
p̂·pH +(1−p̂)pL
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(1 − KP ) + wi



(36)

Figure 1. Investment without lock-in (Panel a.) and with lock-in (Panel b.).
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Figure 2. Distribution of enterprise forms in select industries in Germany, 1895 and 1907.
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Dimensions
Owners
Managers
Investor types
Limited liability
Trade-able shares
Un-called capital

Table 1: A (very) partial taxonomy of dimensions for enterprise choice
Possibilities
One; a limited number great than one; unlimited number
One; many
Identifiable; anonymous
For no owners; for some owners; for all owners
Always tradable; tradable but not on equity markets; tradable with restrictions imposed by the firm or other owners
Yes; no

39

10

Spain: General incorporation from 1892 to 1847,

Spain: Legally possible after 1885, specific regulations introduced 1919

US: 1870s–1880s for a few states, but unattractive; laws in 1950s–1970s

UK: 1907

5
NA

Germany: 1892

are not tradable

NA

France: 1925

NA

US: mostly middle third of nineteenth century, varied by state

All members have limited liability but their shares

NA

UK: 1844 without limited liability and 1855–56 with limited liability

reintroduced 1869 and reaffirmed 1885

10
10

Germany: 1860s–1870, varied by state

are tradable

France: 1867

Required special permission until:

All members have limited liability and their shares

US: no

UK: no

Spain: yes, but not widely used

Germany: yes

c.1907

NA

42

NA

NA

NA

12

7

16

NA

NA

15

7

19

NA

NA

70

35

62

c.1930

35

63

62

NA

NA

38

6

20

NA

NA

4

6

2

NA

NA

20

20

16

allowed close corporations to mimic; 1980s–1990s
Source: Adapted from Guinnane and Martínez Rodríguez (2014). Figures do not always sum to 100 because of the omission of the share partnership and other minor forms. The underlying
data for France and Germany are reported in Guinnane et al. (2007). For the U.S. and Britain partnership figures are not available. The Spanish PLLC did not exist until 1920. The
French PLLC was created in 1925.

PLLC

Corporation

shares can be bought and sold on the market

with tradable shares

NA

US: yes, but in an unattractive form
France: yes

UK: only after 1907

Same as limited partnership, except special partners’

NA

Spain: yes

10
15

Germany: yes

NA

US: yes

management but who have limited liability

NA

UK: yes

and one or more special partners who cannot participate in

75

Spain: yes

19

72

Germany: yes

France: yes

70

c. 1892

Percentage of new firms

France: yes

Availability

One or more general partners with unlimited liability,

Two or more partners, all unlimitedly liable

Limited partnership

Limited partnership

Ordinary partnership

Definition of Form

Table 2: The Menu of Organizational Choices in France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States

Form

